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Abstract 
The aim of this paper was to determine the extent of sharia disclosures made in the 2017 
annual reports for an Islamic Bank in South Africa, hereafter referred to as ‘Bank A’, and an 
Islamic Bank in Nigeria, hereafter referred to as ‘Bank B’. The study is qualitative in nature 
using a case study method, content analysis and disclosure index. The findings indicate that 
for the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) report, the disclosures for Bank A are assessed to 
be 82% compliant versus Bank B whose disclosures are assessed as being 45% compliant. 
The results, in so far as the sharia report is concerned, shows that Bank A is 94% compliant 
while Bank B is 81% compliant. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance (CG) from an Islamic viewpoint is underpinned by the sharia (Islamic 
law) (Bukhari, Awan & Ahmed, 2013:403). Ghayad (2008:208) asserts that the aims, 
purposes and outcomes of business conducted by an Islamic bank are similar to that of its 
western counterparts, except for the condition of sharia compliance. The question then is, 
what are the requirements imposed by the sharia when conducting business? 
 
Muslims view compliance with the requirements of the sharia as a path to seeking the 
pleasure of Allah (God) (Wahab & Rahman, 2011:44). These requirements include the total 
elimination of riba (interest) from all business dealings. It further includes the removal of any 
gharar (uncertainty) from business transactions, as well as the avoidance of the selling and 
purchase of any prohibited goods such as alcohol and pork (Lewis, 2010:47). In light of 
Bukhari, Awan and Ahmed’s (2013:401) point of view, corporate governance is a way to 
monitor the corporate conduct of companies. An Islamic bank is required to appoint a sharia 
board to monitor the bank’s operations and activities in order to ensure that it complies with 
the sharia (Ghayad, 2008:213). Bank A in South Africa and Bank B in Nigeria both comply 
with the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions’ (AAOIFI) 
guidelines, and are the only fully fledged Islamic banks in their respective countries and as 
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such conduct their business in accordance with the sharia. 
 
As part of ensuring their compliance with the sharia, both banks employ an independent 
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) to ensure compliance with Islamic economic principles. This 
additional aspect of sharia governance is unique to Islamic banks (Hasan, 2011:30) and 
provides an opportunity to conduct research into the CG disclosures of these banks relating 
to their sharia compliance. According to Hasan (2011:30), studies conducted on the CG 
practices of Islamic banks are limited. This is particularly the case in Africa, as research is 
scant on the CG practices of Islamic banks. This study is therefore aimed at contributing to 
the literature by providing insight into the sharia CG disclosures of two Islamic banks in Africa. 
 
The following research question is addressed in this study: 
 
RQ: To what extent are sharia disclosures made in the 2017 annual reports for Bank A and 
Bank B? 
 
The findings of this study will contribute to the limited literature that exists for this area, as 
well as to an enhanced understanding of the CG practices of the SSB. 
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR ISLAMIC BANKS 
The idea of CG has been in existence for a long time so as to counter the agency problem 
that arose due to business owners affording the management responsibility to agents (Wixley 
& Everingham, 2002:7; Ibrahim & Htay, 2006:1-2; Alexander et al., 2014:198). The negative 
impacts of corporate scandals, as witnessed in the latter part of the 20th century, instigated 
the development of better CG practices as a means to restore investor confidence (Ibrahim 
& Htay, 2006:2; Mallin, 2007:1; Alexander, et al., 2014:197). The Cadbury Committee in the 
United Kingdom released the Cadbury Report in 1992, which was the first code providing 
guidance on CG practice (Wong, 2015:498). Thereafter, a number of codes on CG have been 
developed (Roberts, Weetman & Gordon, 2005:108). The Cadbury Report defined CG in 
paragraph 2.5 as “a system by which companies are directed and controlled.” Different 
researchers provide a variety of definitions (Choudhury & Hoque, 2006:117; Lee, 2006:21; 
Dunn & Steward, 2014:62), while others contend that no unique definition captures the 
essence of CG (Roberts, Weetman, & Gordon; 2005:108; Muneeza, 2014:33). This is 
because business practice and business values are not homogenous between countries and 
can be influenced by cultural, institutional and religious factors (Wong, 2015:497 & 500). The 
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Islamic finance industry presents a different dimension to CG (Lewis & Algaoud, 2001:158; 
Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2008:184). 
 
The existence of the Islamic finance industry depends on its ability to comply with sharia 
principles (AAOIFI, 2015:962). Thus sharia governance is critical to the industry (Muneeza, 
2014:42). Sharia governance can be defined as the process by which Islamic institutions are 
monitored to ensure that they conform to the requirements of the sharia (Ginena, 2013:88). 
The stakeholders of an Islamic bank, while concerned with its financial performance, may be 
more concerned with its ethics or adherence to religious precepts (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006:2). 
Therefore the non-compliance with the sharia presents a sharia risk that can have disastrous 
consequences for the viability of the Islamic bank (Ariff & Iqbal, 2011:104; Grassa & Matoussi, 
2014:347). 
 
The principles used in conducting business dealings that conform to Islamic religious beliefs 
are derived from the sharia (Islamic law) (Venardos, 2006:41). The sharia is derived from the 
Quran, which is Islam’s holy book, as well as the sayings, actions and approvals of prophet 
Muhammed (PBUH) (Warde, 2010:30). The sharia provides a comprehensive set of values 
and principles to assist Muslims in living a life of righteousness to conform with God’s 
commands (Ahmed, 2006:92; Visser, 2009:10). The sharia as such provides guidance for 
every aspect of a Muslim’s life, which includes parameters for engaging in business dealings 
which are agreed upon by the vast majority of Muslim scholars (Karim, 2001:172; Henderson, 
2007:218). Kettel (2010:37) and Warde (2010:7) state that these parameters include the 
following: (1) the total elimination of interest from all business dealings whether the receipt or 
payment of it, (2) the removal of any uncertain or speculative transactions, (3) all business 
dealings must be backed up by real assets, (4) a payment of 2.5% of one’s wealth acquired 
through business dealings as a zakat (religious tax) to be paid to poor Muslims, (5) all 
business transactions should not include prohibited items such as alcohol, pork or gambling, 
and (6) the use of contracts to facilitate profit and loss sharing in business contracts in order 
to avoid interest. 
 
As the business model, credibility and reputation of an Islamic bank are based on the 
compliance with the above principles (Jamaldeen, 2012:114), it is imperative that an SSB is 
established to govern the Islamic bank’s compliance therewith in order to reduce sharia risk 
(Ariff & Iqbal, 2011:104; Grassa & Matoussi, 2014:353). Sharia risk leads to market 
disruptions as well as reputational and credibility issues that have dire consequences for the 
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industry (Abdullah, Percy & Stewart, 2013:121; Hamza; 2013:226; Malwaki, 2013:576). 
Malwaki (2013:576) is of the opinion that proper sharia governance is the main reason that 
Islamic banks enjoyed less risk as compared to their conventional counterparts during the 
financial crisis in 2008. 
 
2.1. SHARIA SUPERVISORY BOARD 
The SSB is a unique CG structure of an Islamic bank (Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2008:187; 
Grassa, 2013:333). It is mandated to oversee compliance with the sharia, and as such it is 
seen as the most important aspect of governance and hence central to the success of an 
Islamic bank (Malwaki, 2013:541; Hasan, 2014:22; Gebba & Aboelmaged, 2016:147; Hakimi 
et al., 2018:252). The discussion that follows will entail the governance system, appointment, 
composition, independence and membership, qualifications, duties, sharia audit and opinion 
and disclosure requirements of an SSB. 
 
2.1.1. GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
A decentralised system of sharia governance entails that the SSB make decisions on the 
sharia compliance of the Islamic bank that is independent of the SSB of the Central Bank. 
This type of governance is popular in countries such as Kuwait, and Indonesia (Hamza, 
2013:231). A centralised system of governance maintains that while individual Islamic banks 
must have an SSB, they cannot make decisions independent of the SSB that is attached to 
the Central Bank, and as such have to comply with all directives issued by this board. This 
type of governance is popular in countries such as Malaysia and Sudan (Hamza, 2013:233). 
The difference in governance systems often leads to divergent sharia rulings applied to 
Islamic banks, which poses a threat to the credibility of the industry (Hamza, 2013:236). 
 
2.1.2. APPOINTMENT 
Every Islamic bank is required to establish an SSB. Each member of the SSB is appointed 
by the shareholders at the annual general meeting. An engagement letter is required to 
formalise the appointment. It should include the duties to be performed by the SSB member 
as well as a statement that the Islamic bank will comply with all sharia requirements (Van 
Greuning & Iqbal, 2008:189; Ariff & Iqbal, 2011:108; AAOIFI, 2015:885-886). 
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2.1.3. COMPOSITION 
The composition of the SSB should include at least three members who are not directors or 
material shareholders of the Islamic bank (AAOIFI, 2015:886). The average number of sharia 
board members in the United Arab Emirates is 3.6 members (Gebba & Aboelmaged, 
2016:147). In Bahrain, the size of the SSB does not impact on the performance of Islamic 
banks, despite a positive but insignificant effect on the profitability of assets and equity 
(Hakimi et al., 2018:264). Garas (2012:8) found that the size of the SSB is insignificant in 
relation to the SSB’s control over transactions. Hassan et al., (2018:258) examined 54 Islamic 
indices between 2007-2014 and found that a relationship exists between the SSB members, 
specifically boards with more members having similar backgrounds and education and a 
higher risk taking profile on Islamic indices. Interestingly, Jaballah, Peillex and Weill 
(2018:360) studied the impact of adding to or removing information from the Dow Jones 
Islamic Market index as it relates to sharia compliance and changes in pricing thereof. They 
found that greater sharia compliance is perceived more favourably in Muslim countries owing 
to religious beliefs resulting in positive stock market reactions and less favourably in the 
United States owing to negative perceptions about Islam and sharia compliance. 
 
2.1.4. INDEPENDENCE AND MEMBERSHIP 
The requirement that SSB members are to be independent from the Islamic bank is vital in 
maintaining its credibility in fulfilling the role of instilling confidence in all stakeholders that the 
Islamic bank’s operations, including its products and services, are sharia-compliant (Hamza, 
2013:229; AAOIFI, 2015:939). Therefore the SSB functions as an external organ that is 
devoid of any managerial or operational responsibilities (Cima, 2011:44, AAOIFI, 2015:940). 
As such, SSB members are required to assess their independence status and, if any 
impairment arises that cannot be resolved, it should result in the SSB member’s resignation 
from their position (AAOIFI, 2015:940-941). The resignation or dismissal of SSB members is 
final on the approval of the Islamic bank’s shareholders at a general meeting (AAOIFI, 
2015:886). 
 
SSB members are not restricted to serving in the same capacity on the boards of multiple 
Islamic banks, thereby increasing the potential for independence problems (Garas, 
2012a:100; Malwaki, 2013:571). In fact, 71% of SSB members from 43 Islamic banks across 
eight countries serve on multiple boards (El-Halaby & Hussainey, 2015:158). Bassens, 
Derudder and Witlox (2010:338) identified a global sharia elite, consisting of a small group of 
scholars that serve on multiple boards. These sharia scholars are sought out by Islamic 
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banks, as having an association with these ‘gatekeeper’ scholars allows the bank to ‘tap’ into 
markets, knowledge hubs and sources of capital otherwise out of reach. This situation does 
not allow for other scholars to gain experience within the industry (Malwaki, 2013:575), 
therefore Garas and Pierce (2010:396) suggest that scholars seek membership in other types 
of Islamic financial institutions rather than just focusing on banks. 
 
To further reduce instances of problems with independence: 
 
 SSB members must not hold managerial positions or have relationships with management 
in the Islamic bank (Garas, 2012a:100); 
 SSB remuneration should be fixed by shareholders and disclosed in the annual reports 
(Garas, 2012a:100; Hamza, 2013:227; Gebba & Aboelmaged, 2016:148); and 
 Appointments should be made by shareholders and not management (Hamza, 2013:227; 
Gebba & Aboelmaged, 2016:148). 
 
2.1.5. QUALIFICATIONS 
The members of an SSB should primarily be Islamic scholars (Abdul-Rahman, 2010:77). An 
Islamic scholar is an expert in Islamic jurisprudence (Hamza, 2013:228). These scholars are 
also required to be knowledgeable in conventional economic practices (Muneeza & Hassan, 
2014:125). SSB members who are experts in both Islamic jurisprudence and conventional 
economic practice is rare. In practice, most SSB members have PhDs in Islamic 
jurisprudence while less than 40% have degrees in conventional economics. This problem is 
further exacerbated as there is no set education or curricula coordinated for SSB members 
(Hamza; 2013:228; Hayat, Den Butter & Kock, 2013:611 Malwaki, 2013:570; Hakimi et al., 
2018:258; Hassan et al., 2018:249). Van Greuning and Iqbal (2008:190) state that because 
of this lack of expertise, the SSB may have a member who is not an Islamic scholar, but who 
is an expert in both Islamic and conventional business practices (Hamza, 2013:228). Hakimi 
et al., (2018:263) found that SSB members with expertise in conventional finance and 
accounting positively affects performance and return on capital for Islamic banks operating 
in the Middle East. 
 
2.1.6. DUTIES 
The duties to be performed by the SSB are informed by the Islamic bank’s articles of 
association, as well as the terms of engagement as agreed upon when its members were 
appointed (Van Greuning & Iqbal, 2008:187; AAOIFI, 2015:886). For this reason, the duties 
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performed by the SSB may vary between Islamic banks. The literature highlights the following 
duties that are typical for the SSB: (Abdul Jabbar, 2010:287; Abdul-Rahman, 2010:77-78; 
Garas & Pierce, 2010:395; Kettel, 2011:25-26; Abdel-Baki & Sciabolazza, 2013:103; 
Malwaki, 2013:572) 
 
 Issuing Islamic verdicts (Fatwas) on all activities undertaken that are legally binding and 
required of top management to abide by; 
 Advising and consulting top management on religious issues; 
 Preparing operating manuals and transactional procedures that are in line with the 
sharia, 
 Approving products, contracts and services for sharia compliance; 
 Preventing and controlling financial crimes as they are prohibited in sharia; 
 Designing and facilitating training programmes on sharia-compliance; 
 Issuing a sharia opinion by conducting a sharia audit to provide assurance that top 
management complies with the sharia verdicts as issued by the SSB, including the 
annual financial statements; 
 Approving the distribution of profit share between the bank and investment account 
holders; and 
 Providing guidance to management about allocating income to charity that is non-sharia 
compliant. 
 
Differences in educational backgrounds and jurisprudential schools subscribed to by SSB 
members of Islamic banks does result in conflicting Islamic verdicts (fatwas) issued by 
various Islamic banks, ultimately impacting on the image of the industry (Malwaki, 2013:569). 
These verdicts also often lack legal sanction, thus compromising the robustness and 
effectiveness of the industry’s sharia governance mechanisms (Hamza, 2013:230; Malwaki, 
2013:576). 
 
The overarching responsibility of the SSB is to provide guidance to top management 
regarding sharia-compliance; however, the responsibility of compliance rests with top 
management (Nathan & Ribière, 2007:476). 
 
2.1.7. SHARIA AUDIT AND OPINION 
The SSB performs a sharia audit that culminates in a sharia report providing stakeholders of 
the Islamic bank with the reassurance that it is managed in compliance with the sharia 
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(Hamza, 2013:228). Thus the SSB is given unrestricted access to all required information in 
order to be in a position to issue a sharia opinion on an annual basis in the annual report of 
the Islamic bank (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014:127; AAOIFI, 2015:899). Ahmadova (2016:1) 
states that the sharia audit can be conducted by either internal or external auditors, but must 
be supervised by the SSB. 
 
The presence of a sharia report and opinion by the SSB has both explicit and implicit costs. 
The explicit costs are directly related to sharia certification while implicit costs relate to the 
time taken to obtain sharia certification. Other issues with giving sharia opinions as identified 
by Hayat, Den Butter and Kock (2013:611) include: 
 
 Lack of consensus on what constitutes sharia compliance; 
 Small pool of scholars who benefit substantially in terms of financial gains and are thus 
prone to being lenient when giving a sharia opinion to attract business; 
 Scholars who belong to regulatory bodies such as AAOIFI, who supervise the industry 
and inadvertently end up supervising themselves; and 
 The technical ability of scholars to evaluate complex business operations, products and 
transactions for sharia compliance. 
 
2.1.8. DISCLOSURE 
Abdullah, Percy and Stewart (2013) examined the sharia disclosures of 23 Islamic banks in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, specifically those related to the SSB and the content of their report. 
To meet this purpose, they employed a disclosure index, content analysis and hypotheses 
testing. They found that the SSB disclosure is limited, and their detailed findings are as 
follows: 
 
The SSB disclosures made show that a majority disclosed duties, membership, background, 
appointment and remuneration of SSB members; however disclosure of activities were 
limited (meetings, audit and sharia compliance procedures). 
 
The SSB report shows that all the banks ‘title’ their report appropriately. All banks except one 
Indonesian bank provide their sharia opinion in the report. Thirty-five percent of reports 
contain an opening paragraph stating the nature of the engagement. Fifty-seven percent of 
Islamic banks disclose the nature of the work performed in the annual report. Thirty percent 
of Islamic banks confirm that the processes followed in the sharia audit are valid and reliable. 
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Limited disclosure relating to items of a sensitive nature e.g. profit and loss allocation and 
lawfulness of earnings, and three banks had their SSB report signed before the directors 
approved the financial statements. 
 
They also found that Malaysian foreign Islamic banks provide the least disclosure. They put 
this down to their holding companies being conventional foreign banks. They also surprisingly 
found that foreign owned Islamic banks originating from predominantly Muslim countries 
(GCC) provide limited disclosure. They put this down to different emphasis being placed in 
different jurisdictions on what to disclose as opposed to the influence of the Muslim 
community. That in turn also suggests that stakeholders are passive in driving the types of 
disclosure to be provided by Islamic banks and the need for SSB members to play a more 
active role in this regard. 
 
Malwaki (2013:575) opines that the SSB is criticised for its lack of transparency when making 
sharia disclosures. This criticism relates specifically to how to fulfil its mandated duties as 
well as the process followed when providing its opinion on the sharia compliance of the 
Islamic bank. A mandatory requirement when making sharia disclosures should include all 
instances where a conflict of interest exists or membership with other Islamic banks for all 
SSB members. 
 
El-Halaby and Hussainey (2015:159) found that when Islamic banks have sharia boards 
containing more than four members who are also members of AAOIFI, they provide more 
detailed sharia disclosures in the annual reports. 
 
Azmi et al., (2016) used a structured interview process to uncover the reasons for the low 
level of sharia disclosures by sharia compliant companies in Malaysia. Their respondents 
included those who prepare the reports as well as the professional users of the reports. They 
found that both groups of respondents agree that sharia disclosures are understood as found 
in the financial statements; however the professional users are most concerned about the 
sharia screening methodology used in determining sharia compliance. 
 
Asrori (2017:160) examined the disclosures of eight Islamic banks in Indonesia and found 
that disclosures relating to sharia compliance and SSB members’ attendance of meetings 
had a positive impact on performance, while the educational background and number of 
memberships with other Islamic banks did not have an impact on performance. 
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Muda (2017) conducted research to determine the impact that cross-membership and 
expertise of SSB members based on 12 Islamic banks in Indonesia had on sharia disclosure 
using regression analysis. They found that cross-membership did not affect the quality of 
disclosure, while expertise of SSB members did impact on the quality of sharia disclosure. 
Ariff and Iqbal (2011:105) state that the qualifications of the SSB members should be 
disclosed in the Islamic bank’s annual report. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The study is qualitative in nature using a case study method and content analysis. The case 
study approach is suitable for this study, as the banks selected are the only ‘cases’ in these 
respective countries that provide sharia disclosures in their annual reports. The sharia 
disclosures in the 2017 published annual report of Bank A in South Africa and Bank B in 
Nigeria will be examined by using “content analysis” and compared to a disclosure index. 
Guthrie and Farneti (2008:362), as well as Marx, Barac and Moloi (2011:324) respectively, 
used content analysis to determine the extent of CG disclosures in their research. Mayring 
(2000) defines qualitative content analysis as an “empirical approach to controlled analysis 
of text within their context of communication.” The literature has examples of sharia 
disclosure indexes (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006:34; Abd Majid, Sulaiman & Ariffin, 2011:20; El-
Halaby & Hussainey, 2015:155). This study will, however, use an adapted version, of the 
sharia disclosure index developed by Abdullah, Percy and Stewart (2013:129-130) to 
examine the SSB disclosures and sharia audit report of the selected cases. Each disclosed 
item will be scored using a binary system where items disclosed are given a score of “1”, and 
where items are not disclosed a score of “0” is given. Each disclosure item is given the same 
weighting due to its subjective nature, and as such the scores will be totalled and presented 
as a ratio of the actual score to the maximum possible score of each Islamic bank (Abdullah, 
Percy and Stewart (2013:110). 
 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The research findings for the sharia disclosures in the 2017 annual report of Bank A in South 
Africa and Bank B in Nigeria is shown below. 
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Table 1 presents the SSB disclosure index of Bank A and Bank B. 
 
Table 1: Sharia supervisory board disclosure index 
No. Description Bank A Bank B 
1 Report of SSB 1 1 
2 Duties and responsibilities 1 1 
3 Remuneration 0 0 
4 Appointments 0 0 
5 Multiple memberships with other Islamic banks 1 0 
6 Educational background 1 1 
7 Experience 1 1 
8 Independence 1 0 
9 SSB meetings 1 0 
10 Sharia compliance procedures 1 1 
11 Sharia audit 1 0 
 Total Score 9 5 
 Max Score 11 11 
 Percentage 82% 45% 
 
The findings related to the SSB disclosure index show that Bank A significantly outperforms 
Bank B with an overall score of 82% as compared to 45%. Bank A refers to this report as the 
“Sharia Supervisory Report”, while Bank B refers to it as “Our Advisory Committee of Experts” 
report. 
 
Bank A has four members on its SSB, one of whom is a foreigner and three who are South 
African, as compared to Bank B who has six SSB members, one of whom is a foreigner and 
five who are Nigerian. These findings are supported in the literature (AAOIFI, 2015:886; 
Gebba & Aboelmaged; 2016:147). Bank A states that all its SSB members are independent, 
while such a statement is not made for Bank B. This non-disclosure by Bank B regarding the 
independence of its members is not supported in the literature (Hamza, 2013:229; AAOIFI, 
2015:939). The finding by El-Halaby and Hussainey (2015:159) that SSBs with more 
members who are also members of AAOIFI provide greater disclosures, is supported for 
Bank A and not supported for Bank B. 
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Bank A discloses that three of its members also sit on the SSB of other Islamic financial 
institutions. Two of these members are also affiliated with AAOIFI. Details of the affiliation is 
not given for one member, while the other is an AAOIFI certified Sharia Accountant and 
Auditor. Bank B does not disclose this information related to its members. These findings for 
Bank A are in line with the studies performed by Bassens, Derudder and Witlox (2010:338), 
Garas, (2012a:100), Malwaki (2013:571) and El-Halaby & Hussainey (2015:158). 
 
The educational background of the SSB members of Bank A shows that one member has a 
PhD in sharia from an Egyptian university, while the remaining three members have a 
background in Islamic jurisprudence. One member is a lawyer and another has a Diploma in 
Islamic banking and finance. None of the members had any training in conventional 
economics. The educational background of SSB members of Bank B, shows that two 
members have training in conventional economics, specifically a PhD in economics and a 
professor in accounting. The remaining members are all experts in Islamic jurisprudence, 
with three members holding a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence. The finding that SSB members 
are generally experts in Islamic jurisprudence with minimal knowledge in conventional 
economics is supported in the literature (Abdul-Rahman, 2010:77; Ariff and Iqbal, 2011:105; 
Hamza; 2013:228; Hayat, Den Butter & Kock, 2013:611 Malwaki, 2013:570; Hakimi et al., 
2018:258; Hassan et al., 2018:249). 
 
Bank A’s SSB also contains a section informing users about another committee in existence 
called the “Sub-Committee of the Sharia Supervisory Board”. This committee is tasked with 
ensuring that investment funds used by the bank are sharia compliant. It is interesting to note 
that this committee is comprised of all the South African members of the SSB, and part of 
their duty is to report to the SSB on sharia compliance, which appears redundant as they are 
reporting to themselves. Additionally, on further inspection of the sharia report, there is no 
statement giving assurance regarding the sharia compliance of these investment funds 
overseen by the sub-committee. No such committee is reported for Bank B. The disclosures 
for Bank A also indicate that the SSB should hold meetings at least annually and that the 
sub-committee should meet at least four times a year. However, no mention is made whether 
these meetings were convened and who attended them. Bank B does not provide disclosures 
relating to meetings held during the year. The finding related to meetings is supported by the 
study conducted by Abdullah, Percy and Stewart (2013). 
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Finally, while Bank A does disclose what the duties of the SSB members are in the SSB 
report, the duties related to members of the SSB of Bank B is disclosed in the sharia report 
which is called the “Advisory Committee of Experts Report on Shariah Compliance”. This 
finding is supported in the literature by Abdul Jabbar (2010:287), Kettel (2011:25-26) and 
Malwaki (2013:572). 
 
Table 2 presents the sharia audit report disclosure index of Bank A and Bank B. 
 
Table 2: Sharia audit report disclosure index 
No. Description Bank A Bank B 
1 Title 1 1 
2 Addressee 1 1 
3 Opening paragraph (clear purpose of engagement) 1 1 
4 Scope paragraph describing the nature of work performed 1 1 
5 Statement that management is responsible for ensuring sharia compliance 1 1 
6 
Statement that SSB performed tests and 
procedures on: 
 Transactions and dealings 
 Appropriateness of profit and loss allocation 
 Earnings (lawful or prohibited) 
 Zakat compliance 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
7 
Sharia opinion on: 
 Transactions and dealings 
 Appropriateness of profit and loss allocation 
 Earnings (lawful or prohibited) 
 Zakat compliance 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
0 
8 Statement on any violation of sharia compliance 1 1 
9 Report signed by all members of the board 1 1 
10 Date of the report signed after management sign-off on annual financial statements 0 0 
 Total Score 15 13 
 Max Score 16 16 
 Percentage 94% 81% 
 
The findings related to the sharia audit report disclosure index show that Bank A only slightly 
outperforms Bank B with an overall score of 94% as compared to 81%. 
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The sharia report of Bank A provides additional information about the scope of transactions 
covered in their review which includes sukuk (Islamic bonds), Islamic wills, Forex transactions 
and banking and finance fees. This information is not given in the disclosures made by Bank 
B. 
 
The sharia report of both banks does give an indication of the types of audit procedures that 
are performed to ensure sharia compliance as well as compliance by both banks with the 
Islamic verdicts issued by the SSB. What is not clear, however, is what sharia compliance 
means or what Islamic verdicts have been issued and how compliance thereof is assessed. 
This information would be useful to the users of these financial statements to reconcile this 
with their own understanding of sharia compliance. This supports the finding by Hayat, Den 
Butter and Kock (2013:611). 
 
Bank A informs users in their sharia report that impermissible income has been designated 
to be paid to charities. On inspection of note 14 titled “Welfare and Charitable Funds” in the 
financial statements, while 14 million rand has been donated during the year, the fund at 
year-end, has a balance of 15 million rand. Bank B provides clearer communication in this 
regard by informing its users that illegal income has been set aside or transferred to a 
foundation for charitable purposes. On inspection of the “Statement of Sources and Uses of 
Charity Funds”, all impermissible income, that is 20.3 million naira, was distributed during the 
year, leaving the fund with a “zero” balance. 
 
Zakat information is provided by Bank A but no such information is given by Bank B. Both 
banks highlight to users that erroneous transactions were identified and that management 
has been instructed to correct them, but no information is given regarding what these errors 
are, or if they were eventually corrected. 
 
It was also found that the sharia report of both banks was signed before management 
approved the annual financial statements. This increases the risk that non-sharia compliant 
transactions could have been processed in this period, and potential accountability for 
erroneous transactions identified by the SSB was ignored by management. 
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These findings on the sharia report are supported by the studies conducted by Abdullah, 
Percy and Stewart (2013) and Hayat, Den Butter and Kock (2013:611), except for disclosing 
sensitive information such as profit and loss allocation and impermissible income for both 
banks. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The aim of this paper was to determine the extent of sharia disclosures made in the 2017 
annual reports for Bank A in South Africa and Bank B in Nigeria. The findings indicate that 
for the SSB report, Bank A’s disclosures are assessed to be at 82% compliance versus Bank 
B’s whose disclosures are assessed at being 45% compliant. The results, insofar as the 
sharia report is concerned, shows that Bank A is 94% compliant while Bank B is 81% 
compliant. 
 
The study is not without limitations. Only two Islamic banks were included for the study as 
they provide sharia disclosures, and only their 2017 annual report was analysed as it was the 
latest disclosure at the time the study was conducted. Future research should extend this 
analysis to other Islamic banks that operate in Africa. Additionally, future research could also 
focus on determining whether there is any correlation between the performances of Islamic 
banks operating in South Africa and Nigeria in relation to the types of CG disclosures made 
to ensure sharia compliance. 
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